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INTRODUCTION 
Before responding to the merits of Ms. Goodliffe's brief, it is important to note 
that she failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing the 
requirements for briefs on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b) (stating that the appellee's 
brief must comply with all requirements for the appellant's brief except for the statement 
of issues and the addendum). Specifically, she failed to cite to the record for all factual 
assertions made. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7), (e). She also failed to include a statement of 
jurisdiction or a statement of determinative law. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(4), (a)(6). 
Moreover, her "summary of the argument" is insufficient in that it constitutes "a mere 
repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged" and is not suitably 
paragraphed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8). Though not &per se violation of the appellate 
rules, Ms. Goodliffe's table of authorities cites only six cases, two of which bear 
incorrect page number references. 
Instead of responding to Mr. Winward's legal arguments in the order in which 
they were presented, Ms. Goodliffe introduces a completely different structure that 
obscures the four discrete issues presented. She brings up facts that are uncontested and 
irrelevant to the appeal such as the division of personal property, trust administrative 
fees, limitations periods, and the value of the real property held in trust. See e.g., Brief of 
Appellee 7, 14. Ironically, Ms. Goodliffe devoted an entire section of argument to a point 
that was neither raised nor discussed by Mr. Winward. See Brief of Appellee 24. 
Ms. Goodliffe also ignores pertinent dates as evidenced by her statement that 
"Winward owed a fiduciary duty to Myrtle Winward and to Goodliffe and was required 
to act for the benefit of Goodliffe in his handling with [sic] the assets of his father and 
mother. This he failed to do." Brief of Appellee 3. Winward was not a tmstee at the time 
of the transactions at issue. By Ms. Goodliffe's own admission, "Richard E. Winward 
and Myrtle Winward were the trustees of the Richard E. Winward trust and also the 
trustees of the Myrtle Winward Trust during the time that the trustors were alive." Brief 
of Appellee 13. Thus, any improper transfers of trust assets made before August 1, 1992 
would be on the heads of Richard and Myrtle Winward, the sole trustees up to their 
respective deaths. City ofFairview Okla. v. Norris, 234 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1956) 
("The law is without exception that a trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for a breach of 
trust committed by a predecessor trustee."). 
For clarity and because the Court has been asked to review only four issues, Mr. 
Winward will reply to Ms. Goodliffe's argument within the context of the issues actually 
presented. Section I answers the matters set forth in Points One, Four, Six, and Eight of 
Ms. Goodliffe's brief; Section II answers the matters set forth in Points Two and Three; 
Section III answers the matters set forth in Point Seven; and Section IV seeks to answer 
any arguments which Ms. Goodliffe raised pertaining to the issue of whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Winward9 s motions for a new trial or for post-
judgment relief. Mr. Winward does not respond to Point Five of Ms. Goodliffe's brief 
because it is undisputed and irrelevant to the present appeal. Mr. Winward did not raise, 
dispute, or discuss the division of personal property in his brief or elsewhere in his 
appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT MR WINWARD RECEIVED 
MORE THAN $630,000 IN ADVANCEMENTS MUST BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ADVANCEMENT WERE NOT MET. 
Ms. Goodliffe incorrectly suggests that "it is not relevant whether the written 
requirements for advancements were met in this case." Brief of Appellee 2l"> T \ reality, 
whrtfin Ihelrial ntutl jippliol Ihr slaliiioi \ slamlaid loi charging Mr. Winward with 
receipt of hundreds of thousands of dollars in advance! in: ills r, IH,I( .nils relevant bill i1. .1 
critical issue on which this appeal turns. 
A. The Terms of the Winwards^ Trusts Speak for Themselves and Do Not 
Remedy the Fact that Mr, Winward Has Been Improperly Charged 
with Advancements 
In her brief, Ms. Goodliffe devotes nearly six pages to laying out the terms of the 
* 'A m\\ m trust and the Richard E. Winward Trust. She spends a substantial part 
of her argument inirrpiviinj* 11 it • inrnfiiiij' nl ilir word " isscls, w Inch appears in both 
trust documents. She claims that all assets received by Mr. Winward Imm 111>. p.ticnl 1 
must be accounted for to make an equal distribution of trust property. See Brief of 
^ PI n.11 In; r 1 ( 1 11 |l w 1 mild niiikc1 in» ihllerencc whether the asset was in the form, of a 
loan, a gift or any other designation of the asset."). 
Interestingly, Mr, Winward does not dispute the language appearing in the trust 
ii:.'K *"< •. ;i, s ;. .i,: v., Kai:, mi ds opening brief closely mirrors the detailed 
description in Ms. Goodliffe's »-*1 nllrs* wlvUk1! ih< p;irhcs disagree on the 
interpretation of the trusts' terms, one fact is undisputed: The court erroneously tomul -
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on two occasions—that Mr. Winward received $630,443 in advancements, which finding 
resulted in a judgment against Mr. Winward. Charging one with advancements requires 
strict adherence to the statutory requirements as stated in Young v. Young. See 1999 UT 
38, f 24, 979 P.2d 338 ("[T]o qualify as an advancement, the property given must have 
been owned by the decedent and there must be a writing declaring that the property 
given was an advancement") (emphasis added). The trial court did not apply the 
statutory standard in this case. Thus, a reversal of the judgment entered against Mr. 
Winward is not only warranted, it is mandated. 
Ms. Goodliffe asserts that "[a]fter the trusts were created on September 12, 1980, 
both Richard E. Winward and Myrtle Winward held their assets and the trust assets 
jointly." Brief of Appellee 14. She gives no citation for this statement. Moreover, she 
makes the illogical conclusion that because Richard and Myrtle Winward maintained 
some joint accounts that all their personal assets were necessarily trust assets. This 
conclusion is inaccurate and inconsistent with both the evidence presented and the trial 
court's findings. See e.g., Exhibit 13: Tabs 4, 7, Appellant's Addendum J (revealing 
checks made from personal accounts). Judge West found that Richard and Myrtle 
Winward made some payments from their trust accounts, but he in no way found that the 
trust assets and individual assets belonging to the Winwards were one and the same. See 
R. 361:110 (stating that "some of these monies were taken out of some sort of an account 
that was listed as trustees"). Regardless whether the Winwards held joint accounts, it 
does not follow that all assets Mr. Winward received from Richard and Myrtle Winward 
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are necessarily assets received from the trusts, which, under the terms of the trusts, ai e to 
be taken into account in dividing the Myrtle Winward Trust. 
B. Ms. Goodliffe Does Not Refute the Lack of Any Writing Establishing 
an Advancement to Mr, Winward, 
Ms. Goodliffe incorrectly states that "Winward's entire argument relating to 
advancements is based on his conclusion that the Richard E. Winward and Myrtle 
Winward inisl rich melnded ,J provision allowing lor express advancements to be taken 
into account when dividing the assets among the benefic ia r i e •
 te 
Myrtle Winward Trust specifically mentions "advancements/' Mr. Winward's appeal is 
not -ihniii interpreting (in,1 trust language; his appeal is of the trial court's findings that 
charged him with advancements withoi it am w nf HIL» establishing them as sueli. 
In her brief, Ms. Goodliffe takes completely contradictory positions. In one breath 
she admits that the trial court used the term advancement in its ruling and findings. See 
Brief of Appellee 1(} ("lmk>r West did me the nmil 'advancements in his Findings and 
Ruling."). In the next breath, she maintains that "[t]he trial court did n< >i make a finding 
that Winward had received an advancement on his inheritance." Brief of Appellee 28. 
Even ,i enrsory re\ lew of (he record esiahlishes that the trial court found, not once but 
twice, that Mr. Winward had received advancements JII ihe ahsnuv of any leiuill 
recognized writing in support. R. 216. 218-19, 339-40. 
It latinol In; denied Ihal Ihe sums of money charged to Mr. Winward were called 
"advancements." First, the trial eouil \s findings elearly slate lhal "Kennclh h Winward 
received an advancement of trust monies." R. 215, *f 9, Appellant's Addendum D. 
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Further, the trial court's decision unmistakably finds that "Plaintiff received $630,443.00 
in advanced trust monies." R. 192, Appellant's Addendum C. Finally, when given the 
chance to correct a legal error, the trial court expressed that it was "satisfied that its initial 
Ruling on 'advancements' was correct." R. 340, Appellant's Addendum E. If, as Ms. 
Goodliffe stated in her brief, "Judge West also stated that the evidence was clear to him 
that the money given to Winward was not an express advance," then there is an additional 
reason the trial court's judgment must be reversed. Brief of Appellee 26. 
Because Ms. Goodliffe cannot circumvent the trial court's findings and decisions, 
she attempts to re-write them in order to avoid the legal error which clearly exists. See 
Brief of Appellee 9 ("Judge West's comments clearly demonstrate that he was not talking 
about an advancement in the legal sense, but merely referring to assets that had been 
received by Winward from the trust."). Again, she notes "he was not talking about an 
advancement in the legal sense, but merely referring to assets that had been received by 
Winward prior to distribution of the Trusts." Id. at 26; see also id. at 29 ("'Advancement' 
was not used as a term of art, but merely as another way of saying that Winward had 
received assets which were not gifts."). Her creative interpretation of what the trial court 
judge "really meant" cannot supplant the clear and unambiguous language that appears in 
the orders and judgment. Ms. Goodliffe's suggestion that a state court judge would use a 
word, while disregarding the legal implications associated with that word, is absurd. 
Ms. Goodliffe asserts that the trial court found the money allegedly received by 
Mr. Winward to be a loan. See Brief of Appellee 28-29 ("The Court specifically found 
that the monies that he received were loans, not gifts or advancements."); Id at 29 
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("Judge West concluded that Winward did not receive any gilts or ad\ aiK/eim/iits .nul (hat 
c the monies he received were loai ^ "\ Significantly, she provides no record 
citation • *'*. ndings reveals that there is no 
reference to a loan; however, the term advancement is used f\ lotvovci, wlieih", i ilie 
money was a loan is immaterial Ms. Goodliffe's statement that "any assets receiver 
either one of the children mi ist be accounted for" does not change the trial court's error in 
finding that Mr. Winward received hundreds »»( ihtnis;imls o( dollars in advancements and 
only serves to confuse the issues. Simply characterizing the money gi\ ni lo Mi \\ n\\\ aoi 
as a loan instead of an advancement does not eradicate the clear and unmistakable error. 
In her bnel, M «. * ioodliH'e attacks as incorrect IV It , Winward's position regarding 
the requirements for proving an advancement; yet. shei-iic^ absolutel} no can: lt\\ m 
authority allowing any exception to the statutory requirements. See Brief of Appellee 26. 
Youngv. \oimg* MWHi'l <S,<>/'M\2d 1 'MH, remains the controlling Utah case on the 
issue of advancements and prescribes onl'. (Iiuv avntur , lorc Jabltshine an 
advancement. Although Ms. Goodliffe supplied a nice summary of the i ,IM-
con lpletely ignores its holding and the requirements stated in Young. The facts in that 
case are nearly identical to the ("ids ;il ^MIC hnv ,nul tlieie is no basis on which to 
disregard its statement of the law. Specifically, it constitutes legal error lor a trial com ( lo 
I ii nl 11 ml money received by trust beneficiaries is an advancement against their 
inheritance if the slaf ti<on n itu i.i lor ad\ ainvments is not applied or analyzed in the 
findings. See Young, 1999 UT 38, U 25. -
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Ms. Goodliffe cannot deny that the statutory requirements for charging one with 
receipt of an advancement are unsatisfied in this case. First, she admits that the trust 
document fails to provide for specific deductions from Mr. Winward's share as a 
beneficiary: 
There was no evidence, nor any claim during the course of the trial that 
Winward or Goodliffe received any assets by the express condition of the 
instrument (trust). The only express condition of the trusts is under Article 
4, relating to policies of insurances. There was no testimony by either party 
that insurance proceeds existed or were at issue in this case. 
Brief of Appellee 25. Second, Ms. Goodliffe fails to put forth any evidence of a 
contemporaneous writing from Myrtle Winward. That failure is understandable because 
there was no such evidence. The closest thing she references is a statement of the trial 
court, referring to money allegedly given to Mr. Winward, that "the [Richard and Myrtle 
Winward] never wrote if off." Brief of Appellee 26. Nonetheless, it is impossible to 
prove a positive with a negative. Finally, Ms. Goodliffe identifies no written 
acknowledgement from Mr. Winward that would support the finding of advancements 
charged against him. The lack of dispute between the parties on the above three elements, 
which remains the law in Utah, provides sufficient grounds for reversing the trial court's 
judgment. 
C. Regardless of Any Involvement Mr. Winward May Have Had with the 
Club Manhattan, Expenses Attributable to the Club Cannot Be 
Deemed Advancements to Mr. Winward. 
Ms. Goodliffe's argument about the Club Manhattan is cryptic and vague as far as 
who received money from Richard and Myrtle Winward and who had the responsibility 
to repay it. See Brief of Appellee 22. The only definitive amount she claims was 
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transferred to Mr. Winward in relation to the club is $69,000 from the *l* >: 
"The evidence clearly shows that Winward had an ownership interest in the club and 
received $69,00(i in»n» lk: viln; of ihe i mh Unci 01 Appellee „.> In support of her 
statement, she points to the trial testimony of Mr WiiiiMinl1* rv wife <ind m\' Ilei h> 
Purchase the Club Manhattan. 
Neither ot these references contradicts the undisputed fact that Mr. Winward never 
had an ownership interest in Mie - hih R W* 1 •%„ N\ 8 • {> i, J!«'i"' interesting!) Mr. 
Winward was never asked whether he had an ownership interest in the I Muh M.uilufUiti -
in all probability because Beth Winward was listed in every official instrument as the 
ownei K U)l :: I^ S6, KS K7 »1 w\\ \\ MI waul s signature on a document as "Seller" of 
the club is irrelevant. Furthermore, Beth Winward umlt! \w\ \*"0i certamt\ tesl'tv when, 
the $69,000 from the sale ultimately went. See R. 361:90 (stating that "[i]t was given to 
Ken—c • nau i}, the trial court properly excluded the $69,000 from the 
amount charged to Mr, YVmw nul R I1),1 \ppellnnl "s Addendum i \ R Wo-1 i i i took 
out the $69,000 that was attributable to the Club Manhattan."). 
Likewise, the additional transfers of money associated with the Club Manhattan 
cannot and should n< >t he </hcitiial In l\L V\ inwiiul \illi<>iipji Ms. Goodliffe identified 
numerous checks during trial which Richard and Myrtle Winw <iid \u\u\ !<> uinoir. vendor, 
associated with the Club Manhattan, the evidence does not indicate that Mr. Winward 
personal 1 *v^ .^ . ^ > (denying that Mr. Winward ever 
told her that he received any money from Ins pnienls to i im (In, Manliall.ni l Among 
the amounts charged to Mr. Winward is $25,000 that Richard and Myrtle Winward 
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loaned to Jerry Gatto so Mr. Gatto could purchase the Club Manhattan. See R. 192-198; 
361:176. During trial, Ms. Goodliffe was questioned about the transaction with Jerry 
Gatto: 
Q. This is a loan not to you or your brother, but to somebody else? 
A. Jerry Gatto. 
Q. Did it have anything to do with the Club Manhattan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did it have to do with the Club Manhattan? 
A. Jerry Gatto borrowed $25,000 from Richard and Myrtle to—what he did 
with it, I don't know, but it was towards whatever he initially was going to 
do with the Club Manhattan, in purchasing the club. 
361:176. Beth Winward also testified that $25,000 was loaned to Jerry Gatto, not Mr. 
Winward— in spite of counsel's efforts to lead her to identify Mr. Winward as the 
recipient. See R. 361:65-66. When asked if Mr. Winward ever received the $25,000, Beth 
Winward stated "No. No."). R. 361:67-68. The trial court struggled to find why Mr. 
Winward was responsible for a loan to another person. See 361:178 ("Fm having a hard 
time understanding why Jerry Gatto borrowed $25,000 from your parents that has 
anything to do with this estate."). That is because that transaction is one of many that 
cannot under the law be charged to Mr. Winward as advancements. 
In attempting to establish that Mr. Winward held an ownership interest in the Club 
Manhattan, Ms. Goodliffe overlooks the reality that an entity such as a club is its own 
legal person, capable of incurring liability or debt separate from its managers. 
Specifically, Ms. Goodliffe does not respond to the case law put forth that "no organizer, 
member, manager, or employee of a company is personally liable . . . for a debt, 
obligation, or liability of the company." Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f 40, 190 P.3d 
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1269 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-601 (2007)) (finding no evidence that defendant 
acted "in anything other than a representative capacity95). Even assuming arguendo that 
the monies which Richard and Myrtle Winward applied to the Club Manhattan or for its 
benefit were loans that had to be paid back and that Mr. Winward had an ownership 
interest, any such loan would have been to the Club Manhattan and not to Mr. Winward 
individually. 
Ms. Goodliffe's depiction of Mr. Winward as a criminal is utterly false. Mr. 
Winward has no such criminal record as suggested by Ms. Goodliffe on page 28 of her 
brief. See Brief of Appellee 28 ("He also found, that The Club Manhattan was a sham and 
that the reason they put the license in Beth Winward's name was because of Ken 
Winward's bankruptcy or criminal record."). A review of the citation given for this 
defamatory statement reveals that Judge West made no conclusion about a bankruptcy or 
criminal record. See R. 365:12-13 (expressing in uncertain terms that there was some 
reason the license was not put into Mr. Winward's name). The only reason for including 
that slanderous remark is to disparage and humiliate Mr. Winward. That reference should 
be stricken and ignored. 
D. Mr. Winward Has Met His Burden of Marshaling the Evidence in 
Support of the Court's Erroneous Findings on Advancements. 
Mr. Winward has challenged the trial court's finding that he received $630,433 as 
an advancement of trust monies. In so doing, Mr. Winward marshaled the evidence in 
support of the court's finding as required. See Appellant's Brief 20; Young, 1999 UT 38, 
Tf 15 (explaining appellant's burden). 
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The basis for the trial court's finding is that Mr. Winward' parents kept some 
financial records of transactions involving or remotely related to Mr. Winward. R. 
362:342. The trial court also noted that Richard and Myrtle Winward "went to great 
lengths to record the monies that were given to Mr. Winward" and the lack of "written 
forgiveness of all of these debts and obligations." Id, Additionally, the trial court found 
"anticipation that these [transactions] were either a loan or that they were going to be 
accounted for eventually." Id. Regarding advancements associated with the Club 
Manhattan specifically, there was testimony that Mr. Winward had some involvement in 
operating the club, but not as an owner or officer. R. 267; 361:56, 85, 87, 91. Beth 
Winward was at all times the registered owner of the club "on behalf of Myrt and Dick" 
as evidenced by her own testimony. R. 361:85, 87, 91. Beth Winward also acted as the 
president of the Club Manhattan. R. 267. Part of the amount charged to Mr. Winward as 
advancements was $228,494.79 received from the sale of Myrtle Winward's home. Mr. 
Winward admitted owing this debt to the Myrtle Winward Trust in his Complaint and by 
way of stipulation. R. 3, 193. In spite of the above-mentioned facts, the trial court's 
finding on advancements is incorrect and in conflict with longstanding Utah case law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION THROUGH THE 
ADMISSION OF AND RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE TO WHICH MR 
WINWARD CONTINUALLY OBJECTED. 
A. Mr. Winward5s Specific Objections and Continuing Objections 
Identified and Preserved the Evidentiary Issues for Appeal. 
Ms. Goodliffe inaccurately states that "[t]he only objections made by Winward as 
to any of the evidence presented during the trial was [sic] that it was not material or 
12 
relevant." Brief of Appellee 15-16. She also denies that there were any objections to 
testimony about Exhibit 3 or to portions of Exhibit 13. Brief of Appellee 17-18. To the 
contrary, Mr. Winward made multiple objections and continuing objections, which the 
trial court acknowledged and referenced. See e.g., R. 361:92 (continuing objection to 
evidence and testimony concerning financial transactions that were "in gifts or loans that 
were not documented in the trust"); R. 361:106-07 (objection to Exhibit 3); R. 361:121-
22 (recognition of continuing objection); R. 361:58, 152 (continuing objection to Exhibit 
13). 
A continuing objection to a witness' testimony lodged during trial proceedings is 
enough to apprise the trial court judge of problems in the testimony and preserves the 
objection for appeal. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Utah 1989) (analyzing the 
requirements of State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), and finding them fulfilled). 
Here, Mr. Winward's counsel made and was granted a continuing objection to the 
admissibility of and testimony about Exhibit 13 (also referred to as Book No. 2). R. 
361:57-58, 152. Although Ms. Goodliffe's counsel and the trial court call the objection a 
relevancy objection, Mr. Winward never identified it as that or limited it to that ground. 
R. 57-58, 152. Mr. Winward's counsel also made a second continuing objection "as to 
any money that was in gifts or loans that were not documented in the trust," which 
objection the trial court also allowed and acknowledged. R. 361:92. Ms. Goodliffe claims 
that this second continuing objection "does not constitute an objection to the foundation 
for or the authentication of documents introduced as evidence." Brief of Appellee 18. 
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The specific ground for an objection can be inferred from context. See State v. 
Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, f 13, 129 P.3d 282 (noting that the reliability of a report could 
not be raised on appeal because there was no specific objection and the ground for the 
objection was unclear from its context). Moreover, an objection to a document or exhibit, 
even if not specific, constitutes an objection "to the essential foundation necessary under 
the circumstances for admission." State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994, 1000 n.l (Utah 1979) 
(holding that defendant's failure to object to the admission of certain test results did "not 
preclude defendant from raising the issue of admissibility" on appeal). 
In this case, two of Mr. Winward's objections at trial were continuing objections 
that the context shows pertained to the authenticity and foundation of certain documents. 
R. 361:57-58, 92. One continuing objection was made at the time Ms. Goodliffe's 
counsel introduced Exhibit 13, a binder full of handwritten notes and documents which 
were not properly authenticated and lacked foundation. Mr. Winward's counsel made a 
second continuing objection at the time Ms. Goodliffe took the witness stand to follow up 
on Beth Winward's testimony about expenses related to the Club Manhattan. R. 361:92. 
Thus, Mr. Winward properly preserved evidentiary issues for appeal through his 
continuing objections. 
Ms. Goodliffe takes the position that a motion in limine does not constitute an 
objection if appropriate objections are not made "when evidence is presented at the time 
of trial." Brief of Appellee 19. However, a motion in limine can act "as a continuing 
objection to the admission of the evidence at issue" if the trial court does not rule on the 
motion during the party's case. See Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, % 23, 987 P.2d 22 
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(treating motion in limine as requisite objection). Here, Mr. Winward filed a motion in 
limine that sought to exclude any evidence of "gifts made to either party that were not 
designated in writing signed by the Trustor [Myrtle Winward] as express advancements 
or insurance or joint tenancies in accordance with the terms of the trust[.]" Appellant's 
Addendum A. As noted by Ms. Goodliffe, this motion was not heard or decided before or 
during trial. Brief of Appellee 19. Therefore, the motion acted as a continuing 
objection—in addition to the others which were made during trial. 
B. The Statute of Frauds Applies to This Case Because By Charging 
Mr. Winward with Advancements Made to the Club Manhattan, the 
Trial Court Requires Mr, Winward to Answer for the Debts of 
Another, 
Surprisingly, Ms. Goodliffe spends more than two pages in her brief discussing the 
inapplicability of the statute of frauds, but she is missing the point. Although the statute 
of frauds is most commonly used to bar claims from being brought on the basis of a 
contract that is not reduced to writing, the doctrine was introduced in this case simply to 
illustrate that some of the evidence admitted and relied on by the trial court is within the 
statute frauds and, therefore, unreliable and inadmissible. In other words, Mr. Winward 
asserted the statute of frauds as an evidentiary argument rather than a dispositive 
argument. 
Nevertheless, the statute of frauds is directly applicable to this case because, by 
allocating certain payments to Mr. Winward, the Court has required him to answer for the 
debts of another—in this case, the Club Manhattan, which is a completely separate legal 
entity. See R. 361:85 (testimony of Beth Winward that the club was a separate 
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organization from Mr. Winward personally). Ms. Goodliffe claims that u[t]he issues in 
this case did not deal with the assumption of a debt of another." Brief of Appellee 20. 
One wonders, then, how she can insist that Mr. Winward is liable for hundreds of 
thousands of dollars put into the Club Manhattan, a club which he neither owned nor 
represented. See R. 198 (chart prepared and introduced by Ms. Goodliffe). Ms. Goodliffe 
points to no evidence that Mr. Winward agreed to personally guarantee or assume any 
debts of the Club Manhattan to the Myrtle Winward Trust or anyone else. 
Ms. Goodliffe apparently misread Mr. Winward's brief as evidenced by her 
statement that "Winward cites the case of Finlayson v. Finlayson to support his argument 
of the application of the Statute of Frauds." Brief of Appellee 20 (citation omitted). That 
is incorrect. Rather, Finlayson was put forth only for the proposition that enforcement or 
recognition of a personal loan requires documentation. See Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 
P.2d 843, 848 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (stating that trial court's conclusion that certain 
money represented a loan was based on the existence of a signed and dated note as well 
as testimony from the debtor). 
As a response to the argument that the statute of frauds is applicable to protect Mr. 
Winward from liability for the Club Manhattan, Ms. Goodliffe identifies the case of 
Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229 (Utah 1949). Interestingly, that case has absolutely no 
relevancy to the facts or issues in this case. Haws involved the imposition of a 
constructive trust where a mother delivered a warranty deed to her daughter. There was 
no actual trust and no fiduciary relationship. In this case, it is undisputed that an actual 
inter vivos trust was created. Thus, there is no indication of or need to establish a 
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constructive trust. At no time has Ms. Goodliffe claimed that Mr. Winward received 
funds as a constructive trustee. She attempts to extend the holding in Hems to the present 
case even though the facts are entirely incongruent. 
Likewise, the Utah Code sections cited by Ms. Goodliffe concerning the fiduciary 
duties of a trustee are inapplicable to the transactions at issue in this case. Mr. Winward 
was not a trustee of any trust until 1993. All the transactions which Ms. Goodliffe claims 
show a breach of Mr. Winward's duties as trustee occurred before he assumed the role of 
trustee. 
III. THE UTAH STATUTE GOVERNING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS 
INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FOUND 
MR. WINWARD RECEIVED AN ADVANCEMENT, NOT A LOAN, AND 
THE LOSS CALCULATIONS ARE LEGALLY UNSUPPORTABLE. 
While prejudgment interest may be properly imposed on a loan, such is not the 
case where one receives an advancement on his inheritance. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-
1 (2010) (mentioning the default legal interest rate of 10 percent applies "for the loan or 
forbearance of money" without mentioning the situation of an advancement). That is 
because the term advancement is mutually inconsistent with the term loan. See Godfrey v. 
Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (clarifying that a party cannot claim 
an advancement is also a loan). Prejudgment interest is likewise inappropriate when it is 
based on unreliable and conflicting evidence presented in support of a damages claim. 
AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 576 F.3d 1050, 1059 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying 
prejudgment interest under Utah's standard for prejudgment interest, which focuses on 
measurability and calculability). 
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In this case, it is clear that the trial court charged Mr. Winward with advancements 
of trust monies in the total amount of $630,443. R. 216, 218-19. The trial court did not 
award prejudgment interest on the full amount which it determined had been advanced to 
Mr. Winward. Rather, interest was imposed only on the amount of $216,201 which the 
trial court concluded Mr. Winward owed the Myrtle Winward Trust because it exceeded 
what the court determined "[Mr. Winward] would have received under the trust." R. 196; 
see also R. 195, 222-23. Implicit in the court's actions is the fact that prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate where there has been ain advancement of monies. See R. 195 
(refusing to punish Mr. Winward "for using his own money"). The trial court erred in 
awarding prejudgment interest at all on sums which were found to be advancements to 
Mr. Winward. 
In any event, charging prejudgment interest against Mr. Winward is improper and 
inappropriate in this case because there were no legal bases for charging him with the 
receipt of money from the Myrtle Winward Trust in the first place. Had the trial court 
adhered to the legal requirements for finding advancements, the sum charged to Mr. 
Winward as an advancement would have been greatly reduced. 
Notwithstanding Ms. Goodliffe's assertions, the testimony and evidence 
supporting the trial court's ruling on advancements is far from precise. Even though the 
unreliable chart prepared by Ms. Goodliffe displays certain dollar figures, these figures 
were speculative at best and do not meet the standard for advancements from the Myrtle 
Winward Trust. For example, Ms. Goodliffe could not with accuracy testify whether Mr. 
Winward personally received the $69,000 from the sale of the Club Manhattan. R. 
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361:90. Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that only some of the check copies on 
which it based its ruling were even tied to the trust at all. R. 361:110. There cannot be 
any mathematical accuracy in calculating a loss to the trust where the amounts charged to 
Mr. Winward were legally and factually improper. Because the amount charged to Mr. 
Winward is grossly overstated and legally inaccurate as argued above, no prejudgment 
interest award to Ms. Goodliffe is appropriate in this case, and the trial court's award of 
prejudgment interest constitutes error. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MR. 
WINWARD'S MOTIONS FOR POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF AND A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The trial court, of its own accord, admitted from the bench multiple times its own 
error in entering a judgment against Mr. Winward. See R. 365:72 ("[Njowhere in my 
ruling did I award a judgment.9'); 365:72-73 ("[Njowhere in my ruling do I award a 
judgment because I struggled a little bit with how I could because it's a suit by one 
individual against another individual, and nothing was brought on the basis of the trust."); 
365:73 ("How does she get a judgment on behalf of the trust when the trust is not a party 
before me."); 365:75-76 ("I specifically did not award a judgment because I struggled 
with the point that the trust wasn't involved."). As this case now sits, Mr. Winward has a 
judgment of record against him for $560,756 plus interest and attorney's fees. 
Amazingly, Ms. Goodliffe does not respond to or address Judge West's statement that he 
did not intend to issue a judgment. On that ground alone, this case should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In spite of Ms. Goodliffe's attempt to muddy the issues, this Court must reverse 
and vacate in every respect the judgment and orders of the trial court because of the legal 
errors which exist. Judge West charged Mr. Winward with more than $630,000 in 
advancements. No matter how they are characterized, the trial court's findings on 
advancements are not supported by the evidence and do not meet the specific statutory 
and legal requirements for an advancement. Mr. Winward's counsel made appropriate 
and timely objections to unreliable evidence introduced during the trial such that the trial 
court had notice and an opportunity to correct its errors. Additionally, the trial court was 
asked to reverse its judgment and grant Mr. Winward a new trial, which it refused to do. 
Because the prejudicial errors committed by the trial court cannot be "fixed," the case 
should be remanded for a new trial pursuant to the specific statutory and legal 
requirements hereinabove discussed and reviewed. 
Dated this / f f l f f day of September 2010. 
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20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /5*L day of September 2010, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed via first-class 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid to: 
Robert A. Echard 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 201 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
21 
